A striking paradox underlies corporate governance reform during the past fifteen years: centerleft political parties have pushed for pro-shareholder corporate governance reforms, while the historically pro-business right has generally resisted them to protect established forms of organized capitalism, concentrated corporate stock ownership, and managerialism. Case studies of Germany, France, Italy and the U.S. reveal that center-left parties used corporate governance reform to attack the legitimacy of existing political economic elites, present themselves as progrowth and pro-modernization, strike political alliances with segments of the financial sector, and appeal to middle class voters. Conservative parties' established alliances with managers constrained them from endorsing corporate governance reform.
I. Introduction: The Political Puzzle of Corporate Governance Reform
The last two decades have witnessed rapid and substantial political economic change across the advanced industrial countries. Corporate governance reforms, which include the juridical restructuring of both the corporate firm and domestic securities markets, have gathered speed since the mid-1990s and assumed a central position in the politics of this broader transformation. Contrary to the rhetoric and ideology of deregulation, pro-shareholder corporate governance (here starts p. 464) reforms entail regulatory expansion and deepening. Political actors have intervened directly in the organizational structure of and allocation of power within the private sphere at its institutional foundations: the corporate firm. In this article we show that political actors and center-left parties mattered decisively in this process.
1 By examining the country cases of the United States, Germany, France, and Italy, we seek to explain a striking political paradox of finance capitalism and corporate governance reform: center-left political parties were the driving force behind corporate governance reform and the institutional adjustment to finance capitalism, while right of center parties resisted reform to protect established forms of managerialism and organized capitalism. 2 We empirically confirm this general hypothesis and offer a number of explanations for this peculiar political dynamic. In doing so, we propose important qualifications to the "varieties of capitalism" literature and recent interest group analyses of the politics of corporate governance to better capture the political dynamics underlying structural and economic change.
Contrary to common understandings of corporate governance reform, political conservatives were seldom enthusiastic reformers and often resisted pro-shareholder laws, while the center-left has tended to champion the cause of shareholders, and thus finance capital, in opposition to managers. It is reasonable to hypothesize that the center-left should oppose, rather than support, corporate governance reform. 3 At first glance, the distributional consequences of corporate governance reform would appear to conflict with traditional left-wing political commitments to working class and low-income constituencies. Increased shareholder orientation is likely to sharpen incentives to increase short-term corporate profitability, reducing the role of stable financing through "patient capital" and cross-subsidization, and shifting income and wealth from wage-earners to shareholders. 4 Corporate governance reform also increases the likelihood of hostile takeovers that tend to shift rents to shareholders. 5 Reform threatens to decrease the power and influence of employees within the firm and economy at large. Center-left parties should oppose a policy agenda that would harm one of their core constituencies. In fact, the evidence indicates the reverse.
Although our country cases represent different forms of political economic organization and nationally distinctive center-left parties, we find a clear and distinct pattern: Center-left parties and politicians have often been instrumental proponents of reform while conservative parties and politicians have typically resisted reform and defended the interests of incumbent managers. This paper speaks to a policy field that, so far, has not been systematically examined within the political parties literature and develops an argument that runs counter to the expectations of the mainstream of political economy (and law and economics) literature on corporate governance. 6 These accounts of politics, policy, and governance tend to identify the center-left and organized labor as inimical to corporate governance reform and hostile to shareholder interests. We find, to the (here starts p. 465) contrary, that center-left parties are not necessarily comprised of those favoring "politics against markets," 7 but tend to favor-compared to the center-right-market-enabling and pro-shareholder legal reforms that mark a new and surprising turn in corporate governance policy and political economic development more generally. Rather than self-reinforcing institutional complementarities and business-supported path dependence common to the "varieties of capitalism" theory of Hall and Soskice (2001) , we find tensions within these national models that spill over into the political realm of policymaking and threaten to destabilize and undermine their institutional complementarities. 8 Finally, our findings diverge from the recent work of Mark Roe that argues that agency costs increase with the political strength of the labor movement and social democratic parties. 9 In Roe's model, managers-by definition-find themselves somewhere in between shareholders and employees, pressed to side with either the one or the other group. In this analytic model, employees always increase agency costs. Our findings indicate that this theory does not recognize the non-liberal character of the center-right in most countries and fails to appreciate the role the center-left has played in corporate governance reform. By pressing for substantial securities regulation and company law reforms, the left has not only benefited labor, it has also strengthened shareholders and other financial interests. It has re-established the balance among shareholders, managers, and employees in the shareholders' favor.
All four country cases belong to the group of the seven largest and wealthiest industrial nations (G7), yet possessed divergent political economic structures with very different financial systems and corporate governance regimes. 10 In France, the state used ownership of industrial enterprises and banks along with tight governmental control over credit and finance as levers of statist economic planning and management. Major firms were situated in a hierarchical political economic structure in which markets remained stunted and managerial autonomy was constrained by state oversight and control. 11 The Italian case, in partial contrast, combined high levels of state ownership of financial institutions with a "familial" form of capitalism defined by tight networks of family-controlled firms and conservative political elites. 12 Compared with
France and Germany, the Italian political economy was far less formally coordinated and organized for purposes of economic policy, while high levels of corruption accompanied undeveloped financial markets. Germany represents a classic case of a "coordinated market economy" (CME) with negotiated, strategic coordination among centralized peak associations, strong unions, financial networks of corporations and banks, and including employee representation within the firm. While state ownership remained fairly low by French or Italian standards, the country's capital markets remained undeveloped within a bank-centered financial system. The United States exemplifies the "liberal market economy" (LME), with a marketdriven financial system, liquid and well-developed securities (here starts p. 466) markets, diffuse share ownership that separates corporate ownership from control, extremely weak unions and negligible employee representation within the firm. These corporate governance characteristics gave rise to the American form of managerialism and have typically privileged managers over shareholders in corporate and political affairs. 13 Although scholars often describe these national cases as falling within a LME-CME typology of political economic organization 14 , we see both wider variation among them and an overarching political dynamic of economic crisis, political entrepreneurship and repositioning, coalition formation, and institutional and regulatory reform. Given the wide variations of law and institutional structures across these cases, the parallels in the processes and dynamics of corporate governance reform are all the more striking and significant. 15 The following sections set out the basic contours and reform of the French, Italian, German, and American national corporate governance regimes. The analysis of each specifies the main drivers and political constellations of reform. The article concludes with a synthetic comparative section generalizing our main theoretical findings and their implications.
II. France: From Statism, to Privatization, to Regulatory Reform
Historically, of our four cases, France was the most highly centralized and statist. Not only did the French state wholly own or control a large number of the country's leading industrial and financial firms, but it also maintained tight control over the allocation of credit and thus over banks and corporate finance. 16 The regulatory structure reflected the centralization of the French state and maximized the discretionary authority and power of state actors to formulate and carry out economic planning and industrial policy.
Prior to 1967, securities regulation was not even a recognized area of French law. 17 In 1967, France's first securities law created a national securities markets regulator, the Commission des Operations de Bourse (the COB), and a rudimentary framework for financial disclosure. 18 But the intensely statist character of industrial policy limited actual transparency.
Tightly knit political-bureaucratic-corporate elites decided policy and corporate strategy with minimal accountability. These state-firm relations fostered the corruption and corporate financial scandals that have long pervaded French politics and business. 19 French company law reinforced the insider domination of corporate firms by managers and fostered political-managerial relationships. French company law provides for a unitary board structure, but subordinates shareholder interests to "corporate interests" and the public interest embodied in state economic (here starts p. 467) policies. There are few legal provisions for fiduciary duties to effectively protect shareholders. 20 Throughout the post-war period boards protected the interests of controlling shareholders and attended to the demands of state economic policy rather than the interests of minority shareholders. In addition, a history of ideological labor militancy and uncooperative labor relations induced the exclusion of employees from firm governance.
The highly centralized and concentrated market structure of the French corporate economy depended on state finance, cross-subsidies, and credit allocation. Ownership structures were likewise centralized, either through state ownership or through the predominance of "blockholding" shareholders and family ownership of closely held firms. 21 State administration of finance and widespread public ownership of enterprise displaced market-driven financial relations and constrained the broader development of financial markets. 22 Markets remained truncated. Paradoxically, managerial power thrived in this statist environment. Shareholder rights, institutional investment, and labor codetermination laws limit managerial dominance, but would have impaired state control over the corporation as a mechanism of economic policy.
Accordingly, these legal mechanisms never developed under the dirigiste regime. 26 However, upon returning to power in 1988, the Socialists did not reverse and, in fact, continued and accelerated the privatization process through sales of minority equity stakes in state-owned companies.
Led by state policymakers, by the late-1980s a general consensus emerged among the center-right and center-left that the development of capital markets in place of statist financial control was essential to improved corporate and macroeconomic performance. 27 The liberalization of financial markets eroded state control over finance. During the same period, disclosure of political corruption and successive corporate finance scandals undermined the legitimacy of established links between firms and the state financial bureaucracy. Under these conditions, privatization became a self-reinforcing policy that persisted through changes in government and party dominance. (here starts p. 468)
Major political and financial scandals heralded the fundamental reform of French securities markets regulation that came with the enactment security disclosure laws in 1988 and 1989. 28 The reforms targeted not only private abuses of the markets, but the corruption and manipulation that emanated from the state's control over finance and the privatization process. 29 The reforms created the legal and regulatory infrastructure for autonomous corporations and market finance in the private sphere while buttressing the shaky reputation of the scandal-tainted Socialist government. More stringent securities regulation and shareholder protections under company law were pursued to assuage the doubts of a public unused to equity investment and foreign investors suspicious of underdeveloped, insider-dominated French markets. Corporate governance reform therefore followed proximately from the state policy of privatization and disengagement from direct control over finance. The 1988 reforms substantially expanded the enforcement power of the COB and imposed stricter disclosure, market manipulation, and insider-trading rules. The law also established two largely self-regulatory bodies, the Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs ("CBV"), and the Societe des Bourses Francaises ("SBF"), to oversee the stock exchanges in matters such as broker regulation, listing procedures, and tender offers. 30 The Security and Disclosure Law of 1989 gave the COB sweeping investigative and punitive powers, including the authority to impose monetary and injunctive sanctions and to cooperate with foreign regulators. 39 The extraordinary predominance of a number of families in corporate ownership and control has led the Italian corporate governance regime being referred to as "family capitalism." 40 Case studies indicate that Italian corporate cross-shareholding and interlocking directorates are even more extensive and intensive than in Germany. 41 The Italian two-tiered board structure has provided weak oversight of the management board despite the existence of audit committees. Italian law also provided an extraordinarily low level of minority shareholder protection, reflected in the abnormally high control premium commanded by controlling holdings of stock compared with the market price of minority shares. 42 Italy also had one of the most bank-centered financial systems among the industrialized democracies. 43 But, unlike their German counterparts, Italian credit institutes (until 1993) were not universal banks, and firms usually had credit relationships with a large number of banks at the same time. Accordingly, banks did not have substantial shareholdings in firms and had little incentive to monitor or wield substantial power over corporate managers. These legal and ownership structures gave rise to the insular "salotto buono," a powerful interconnected clique of family capitalists that control many of Italy's largest firms. 44 The relatively high level of state ownership of firms, especially in the financial sector, and the prolonged political dominance of the Christian Democratic Party profoundly shaped the Italian corporate governance regime in structure and its opaque-and frequently unsavory--practices. In the mid-1990s, eight out of the twenty largest Italian stock corporations were state controlled. 45 The Beginning in the mid-1980s, amid lagging macroeconomic and corporate performance, political elites embarked on a debate over Italy's competitiveness and economic woes. 47 As in
France, the performance of state owned corporations was notoriously poor. Italy's poor economic performance also threatened Italy's participation in European economic and monetary integration as those processes gathered political momentum in the European Community during the later 1980s and early 1990s. In the context of this debate, Italy's underdeveloped capital market posed an increasingly serious comparative economic disadvantage and political liability.
By the early 1990s, EU integration through European Monetary Union (EMU) and the Single
Market Program exerted direct and indirect pressures for reform of Italy's macroeconomic policies, state-owned firms, and its undeveloped financial markets and regulatory framework.
After the signing of the Maastricht treaty and a humiliating devaluation of the Lira in 1992, the Italian public supported EMU and the policies necessary to achieve the EMU's criteria of low inflation and budget discipline more strongly than any other large European electorate.
48
Privatization became a principal instrument of achieving fiscal discipline, public debt control, and therefore monetary stability while eliminating a principal channel of corruption.
The Italian privatization program, like its French counterpart, was one of the most extensive among the OECD countries and constituted a profound transformation of the domestic political economy. 49 In 1997, the government sold off its entire equity stake in Telecom 473) policy priorities. 52 The old alliances between former Christian Democratic politicians and industry marshaled resistance to these reforms and sought to protect the established governmentbusiness relationships and the insider-dominated model of Italian corporate governance.
However, through much of the 1990s, the political right was in such disarray that it could not mount an effective defense against the reformers. Between 1996 an 1998, left-wing governments passed a series of major securities laws governing the behavior of mutual funds and financial intermediaries. The most dramatic and by far the most important corporate governance reforms, however, were the D'Alema government's "Draghi reforms" in 1998. Drafted by a commission headed by the Treasury's Director-General and former economics professor Mario Draghi, the reforms were designed to increase minority shareholder protection in order to further the development of Italian equity finance and securities markets. 54 The main provisions of the Draghi reform were:
• Anti-takeover defenses must be approved by the shareholders' meeting.
• Minority shareholders' rights strengthened, reducing threshold to call a special shareholders' meeting to 10%.
• A stronger role for the internal audit committee, with at least one member appointed by minority shareholders.
• Proxy voting reforms to facilitate shareholder voting (proxy voting had been virtually prohibited by strict regulation).
• Rules discouraging the building of control blocks.
• More stringent financial disclosure regulation, particularly with respect to the ownership and holdings of subsidiaries and corporate pyramids.
Looking to the Italian party system, the PDS was the driving force behind corporate governance liberalization, not only during the center-left "Olive Tree" coalition government 
IV. Germany: The Reform of Deutschland AG and the Microcorporatist Firm
The scholarly literature has treated the German political economy and corporate governance regime as a model case of a "coordinated market economy." 61 Prior to 1990, a set of distinctive and tightly intertwined institutional and informal relationships among corporate stakeholders distinguished German corporate governance from the Anglo-American neo-liberal market model, the statist French case, and Italian familial capitalism. The capacities for strategic economic coordination within German corporate (and sectoral) governance arrangements were not imposed by the exercise of discretionary state power, but were largely self-organized within a political economic environment of hierarchically organized interest groups. Large private banks with their close personal ties with both industrial companies and public authorities established linkages of mutual influence between the private and the public spheres. 62 Unlike
France, Italy, or the United States, the German corporate governance regime endowed both universal banks and employees with strong institutionalized forms of representation within the corporation. 63 The large banks established a dense network of interlocking long-term credit relationships and ownership ties with large industrial companies from so many sectors that they adopted an interest in coordinating industrial policy as a whole. 64 These relationships and linkages, formed in the years of reconstruction after World War II, persisted through the following decades. Personal ties through interlocking supervisory board directorates deepened cooperative relationships between banks and industrial firms. For this reason, the debate over German corporate governance has been, to a large extent, a debate over the power of banks. In Germany, general considerations of industrial and financial sector competitiveness drove financial market and corporate governance reforms. 66 In the 1980s, the rise of persistent mass unemployment and the growing political and economic pressures of European integration triggered a debate among German elites over German competitiveness and regulatory harmonization that raised the question of financial system reform. By the early 1990s, most large German universal banks, suffering from falling profit rates in a saturated banking market, began to shift their business strategies and policy preferences from the established relational banking model towards the development of new financial services capacities based on a more market-based financial system. 67 The banks and their peak association, the BDB, and political allies realigned in support of securities market reform. This change in orientation complemented
German political support for European economic integration, which had been stymied, in part, by opposition from domestic financial institutions. Though managerial ranks remained divided, managers of some large German corporations backed much of the reform agenda to increase their access to foreign capital markets. By the early 1990s, the reform of securities law and regulation quickly became a consensual policy among German political and economic elites.
Taking advantage of the elite consensus that had formed in favor of financial market reform, the CDU-led Kohl government passed a succession of three major "Financial Market
Promotion Acts" between 1990 and 1998 to stimulate the growth of equity markets, private investment, and domestic institutional investors. 68 The This "tax gift", especially for the large banks, triggered a partisan conflict, in which the Christian Democrats on the right and the PDS on the left both opposed the government, with the FDP caught between the ideological positions. 76 The government went on to sponsor a governmental Corporate Governance Commission, its Code of Best Practices, and a series of less politically contentious corporate governance reforms. 77 The SPD's attempt to straddle the interests and labor and financial capital sparked conflict over the neo-liberal thrust of a proposed EU Takeover Directive designed to introduce hostile takeovers to Continental Europe. The SPD government had approved the Directive, and was left vulnerable to a CDU attack. The CDU countered an SPD agenda that bridged the interests of labor and capital with one that appealed to an alliance of labor and management. The SPD beat an embarrassing retreat and joined the CDU to oppose the Directive in the European Parliament where it was defeated. 78 Immediately thereafter, however, the SPD government advanced its own domestic takeover law. The parties' negotiations over the German Takeover Act in November 2001 broke down into a divisive battle over financial and managerial power.
Once again, the CDU defended German organized capitalism and managerialism. Perceiving takeovers as a threat to German managerial interests and the underpinnings of the post-war German economic model, CDU leaders argued for much greater managerial and supervisory board latitude in adopting anti-takeover defenses. 79 SPD and Greens argued that "the shareholders own the corporation and should have the final say" 80 and, holding a majority in the Bundestag, passed a takeover law that limited anti-takeover defenses to a surprising degree. However, the corporate governance reforms of the past decade have produced lasting change in structural terms and, increasingly, in economic behavior and outcomes. The German company network has begun to dissolve. The adoption of international accounting standards, stock options, American-style investor relations practices, profitability targets for subsidiaries, restructurings that aim to focus on core competencies, and the adoption of investment banking strategies indicate significant change at the company level. 82 The general question hanging over current German politics is whether the grand coalition will be willing or able to enact any significant economic reforms. The more specific question for our purposes is whether the center-left, in defeat and weakened by open revolt on its left, can politically reconcile the economic conflicts between workers and financial capital through a pro-shareholder corporate governance reform agenda.
V. The United States: Scandal, Reform, and the Perils of Neo-Liberalism
The American case is the archetype of modern finance capitalism. But although it pioneered modern securities regulation, corporate governance reform came later to the U.S. than The politics of American corporate governance reform during the 1990s swerved between efforts to protect managerial interests and measures increasing shareholder protections.
In 1995 and 1998, Congress enacted securities litigation reform legislation designed to reduce the incidence of securities litigation. 84 Political motivations drove the conservative's legislative attack on securities litigation as much, if not more than, as economic considerations. They strengthened the position of managers, a predominantly Republican constituency, by weakening one of the most important enforcement mechanisms of transparency and managerial accountability, while attacking the financial base of a plaintiffs' bar that overwhelmingly supported Democrats. However, throughout the 1990s, the SEC initiated a series of reforms to improve managerial accountability and financial transparency. In 1992, the SEC amended its proxy rules to encourage greater governance activism by institutional and other large shareholders. 85 But the SEC failed in its efforts to reform the regulation of accounting rules to require the expensing of stock options and to limit accountants' provision of audit and non-audit consulting services to the same clients. The accounting firms and "new economy" technology firms enlisted allies (here starts p. 482) in Congress, in both parties, to bring legislative pressure on the SEC until these proposals were withdrawn. 86 Finally, the SEC pushed through Regulation The law was the product of political struggle between Democrats using financial scandals against the Republicans, and Republicans seeking to dilute the reform legislation in keeping with their long-standing alliance with corporate managers and an anti-regulation policy agenda. 89 The
Bush Administration was firmly, if quietly, hostile to major legislative and regulatory reform. The interest group politics surrounding the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were even more fractious and disrupted by scandal. Corporate managers lost prestige and political influence as the public began to perceive them as collectively corrupt and responsible for the looting of American corporations. 91 The development of securities markets, mass shareholding, and the growth and diversity of investment funds in the United States meant that financial interests, ranging across a wide range of financial institutions, institutional investors, individual shareholders, and securities market operators, were divided in their preferences concerning the substance and extent of corporate governance reform. Financial institutions, such as investment banks, commercial banks, and brokerages, were split over the reforms. They are dependent on public faith in the integrity of the securities markets, but are also privileged insiders that benefited from the status quo and stood to lose from reform. Many were also weakened in the political process by their roles in numerous scandals. Accounting firms fought strenuously against the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms-even at the risk of further antagonizing public opinionbut were in no position to stem the tide of popular opinion and political pressures for reform.
Institutional investors were a surprisingly impotent political force for reform. Since the 1980s they were predominantly committed to a voluntaristic form of (here starts p. 484)
corporate governance activism and skeptical of, and often hostile to, increased regulation. Union pension funds were a partial exception to the peripheral role of institutional investors in the legislative politics of corporate governance reform. These funds have long been the most activist investors in corporate governance, with ideological and strategic commitments to constraining imperious managers. They are also closely tied to their founding unions and the AFL-CIO, which-despite the weakness of American organized labor-remain core contributors and voting constituencies of the Democratic Party. Yet the political activism of even these well-organized funds had a marginal influence on the substance of reform. Overall, the breakdown of interest group politics as usual facilitated corporate governance reform, not the pressure from interest groups. Managers, accounting firms, corporate attorneys, and politicians (of both parties)
antagonistic towards regulation were almost completely sidelined in the policy debates over corporate governance reform at the peak of the post-bubble scandals.
However, unlike the center-left political dynamic in our European cases, American corporate governance reform did not reflect a stable, long-term realignment of interest groups and partisan politics. The Democrats used the post-bubble scandals and the collapse of share prices to attack a deeply conservative and pro-manager Republican leadership and as a wellplaced appeal to middle class voters in a country where mass shareholding was well-established.
This political strategy was not the product of long-term interest group realignment or a shift in the Democrats' policy preferences. Rather, corporate governance reform fit well within the contours of the center-left ideology and the Democrats' historical support for the regulatory state.
Indeed, the New Deal of the 1930s created modern securities regulation. However, the Democrats' enthusiasm for reform was tempered by their evolution into a purely centrist and largely pro-business party. Their capacity to push for reform was hobbled by the relative absence of class-based politics in the United States. 92 Further, the splits within and among influential interest group proved to be a temporary condition that ended as the scandals receded elites. These relationships, facilitated by law and public policy, allowed the capture of vast rents produced by economic development and corporate activity. The center-right had an enormous stake in preserving these relationships-and the legal frameworks that sustained them-from erosion and destabilization by financial system and corporate governance reform. In Italy, followed by Germany, where these party-management linkages were strongest, center-left support for corporate governance reform and center-right resistance are most evident. French managers had links to both the Socialist and conservative parties and this explains, in part, why evidence of a right-left party split over the center-left reform agenda is more ambiguous;
although still more supportive of reform than the right, the left was "pulled" back from shareholder-friendly reforms to a greater degree than its counterparts in other countries.
Similarly, the Democratic Party in the United States relies on and has extensive relationships with managerial elites, which blunted calls for corporate governance reform until the post-bubble scandals overrode the constraints of pluralist interest group politics. However, in all four cases manager-party relations were and are asymmetrical: managerial elites have deeper and closer ties to parties on the right which induced conservatives to defend the managerialist status quo.
In contrast to the intuitively predictable managerialism of the center-right, the center-left In sum, economic developments altered the political terrain on which political parties maneuvered for strategic advantage, but in ways that constrained the center-right to a greater degree than the left. As a result, in some important ways center-right parties became truly conservative in their policy positions, rather than neo-liberal. Their opposition to corporate governance reforms that would threaten the power and autonomy of corporate mangers was an effort to preserve a broader form of economic organization in which the internal structure and operation of the corporate firm had always played a central though often underreported role. The fiscal crisis of the state, the perceived need for more extensive and rapid corporate restructuring, and the evolving interests within the financial sector and organized labor presented the centerleft parties with an opportunity to appeal to new constituencies as pro-growth economic modernizers and to distance themselves from backward looking nostalgia for post-war economic policies and models that appeared to have run into chronic crisis.
VII. Conclusion
Corporate governance reform and the development of finance capitalism across the In general, Marxist and radical left parties do not behave in accordance with the 'party paradox' of corporate governance reform. The puzzle we describe and the explanation we offer do not apply to them.
2 Our use of the term "finance capitalism" refers to an economic order characterized by increasing competition, the expansion and deepening of financial markets, and more extensive regulation of the corporate firm's financial and governance practices consistent with the growth off market-driven finance. This conception of finance capitalism stands in sharp contrast to that developed by the German Socialist Rudolph Hilferding in the early twentieth century.
Hilferding described a German economy dominated by monopolistic enterprises with strong financial linkages to major banks (and often to each other). In many ways, contemporary finance capitalism is the antithesis of 
